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Abstract
In many instances of election, the electorate appears to be a composite of partisan and in-
dependent voters. Given that partisans are not likely to convert to a different party, a main
goal for a party could be to mobilize independent voters toward the party with the help of
strong leadership, mass media, partisans, and effects of peer-to-peer influence. Based on the
exact solution of the classical voter model dynamics in the presence of perfectly partisan voters
(i.e., zealots), we propose a computational method to maximize the share of the party in a
social network of independent voters by pinning control strategy. The party, corresponding to
the controller or zealots, optimizes the nodes to be controlled given the information about the
connectivity of independent voters and the set of nodes that the opponent party controls. We
show that controlling hubs is generally a good strategy, whereas the optimized strategy is even
better. The superiority of the optimized strategy is particularly eminent when the independent
voters are connected as directed rather than undirected networks.
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1 Introduction
We often flip our opinions in response to what others are doing. In various situations ranging
from voting to adoption of new habits, it is widely recognized that opinion formation on a
large scale is considerably influenced by peer-to-peer interaction among individuals embedded
in social networks [1–4]. On the other hand, such contagion effects seem to be irrelevant to
some individuals that are resolute on the matter and do not feel the pressure of peers. For
example, in election, the electorate is usually a composition of partisan voters in favor of
specific parties and independent voters [5, 6]. Because partisans are reluctant to change, the
main goal for a party would be to mobilize independent voters toward its candidate. The aim in
the present theoretical study is to explore efficient strategies for attracting independent voters
when independent voters are connected as a social network and different parties are allowed to
influence some independent voters.
In models of collective opinion formation, perfectly partisan voters, or the parties themselves,
have been analyzed under the names of pinning controllers and zealots. Pinning control of
networks, in which a controller unidirectionally affects some selected nodes, is an effective
method to guide the state of nodes in a coupled dynamical system to a desired state such
as the synchronized state. The idea has been explored in linear and nonlinear dynamical
systems coupled in networks [7–9]. We apply this idea to opinion control in complex networks.
Theoretical studies of pinning opinion control in collective opinion dynamics date back to at
least studies of zealots in the voter model. The voter model is a paradigmatic model of collective
opinion formation, in which individuals would flip their opinions at a rate proportional to the
number of neighboring others selecting the opposite opinion [1, 3, 10–12]. Mobilia first showed
that dynamic dramatically changed upon the introduction of zealots, i.e., stubborn voters,
to the population of ordinary voters [13]. Zealots correspond to perfect partisans, leaders
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in a community, or mass media and are mathematically the same as pinning controllers (see
[14,15] for the case of error-prone zealots). With the voter model and other opinion formation
models, it has been also shown that existence of zealots in favor of the opposite opinions, like
competing parties, induces coexistence of the different opinions in the equilibrium [16–21]. This
phenomenon contrasts to that for the voter model without zealots [1,3,10] and with a single type
of zealot [13]; in these cases consensus is always reached in finite networks and low-dimensional
infinite lattices.
Controlling opinion dynamics implies that there is a control objective such as the desired
final state or cost minimization. Most of existing literature on voter models in the presence
of zealots has described phenomena induced by zealots but has not treated opinion control
in a proactive sense. Among the studies that treated opinion control explicitly, some studies
assumed the presence of just a single type of zealot [22–25]. To the best of our knowledge, two
studies considered opinion control in networks by competing zealots, similarly to the present
study. In Ref. [26], the authors considered a control strategy in which the highest-degree nodes
are controlled. They solved an optimization problem numerically by transforming the problem
into that of a random walk in the network and numerically running the random walk. Their
objective function was the control cost under the condition that the fraction of votes in favor
of the controller’s opinion must be at least a prescribed threshold. In Ref. [21], the authors
treated optimal selection of newly controlled nodes under the condition that the two subsets
of nodes that the focal zealot and the opposing type of zealot controlled at the moment were
known. They proposed a greedy algorithm that exploited the submodularity of the objective
function. However, the main focus of the article was in theoretical evaluation of the algorithm,
and the proposed algorithm was not numerically tested on networks.
In contrast to these studies [21, 26], in the present study we establish the procedure to
maximize the number of vote by independent voters using linear algebra. We assume zealots
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(equivalently, pinning controllers) possessing different opinions can influence some independent
voters, represented by nodes in a social network, to try to coax independent voters into their own
parties. On the basis of the exact solution on the mean number of vote in favor of each opinion
in the presence of zealots, we establish a method to compute the solution and heuristically
optimize the mean number of vote using power iteration. Then, we apply the proposed method
to several complex networks. In particular, we examine whether controlling high-degree nodes
(i.e., hubs) is efficient or not depending on networks.
2 Model
We assume a directed and weighted network with N nodes, which may have self loops. Each
node is occupied by an independent voter. Therefore, we also refer to nodes as independent
voters. The weight of the link from node i to j is denoted by wij ≥ 0 and represents the
strength of the influence of independent voter i on independent voter j in opinion formation
dynamics. The N independent voters dynamically switch their opinions between two options
A and B, as we will specify in the following.
We also assume that the network is strongly connected so that there is no root node or
root component to send out directed links to the remainder of the network without receiving
directed links from outside. Such a root would effectively function as zealot because the opinion
of the root is not affected by the remainder of the network; we will introduce zealots externally
in the following. For undirected networks, the strong connectedness is reduced to the usual
connectedness.
Apart from the N independent voters, we assume zealots (i.e., perfect partisans) each of
which favors one opinion. By definition, zealots never change the opinion and are given as
elements external to the network of independent voters (Fig. 1). The control gain represents
the strength with which a zealot influences an independent voter. We denote by pA,i(≥ 0) and
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pB,i(≥ 0) the control gain on independent voter i for a zealot in favor of opinion A and B,
respectively. The control gain plays the same role as the link weight, wij . We use different
terms and symbols to distinguish interaction between a pair of independent voters (link weight,
wij) and that between a zealot and an independent voter (control gain, pA,i and pB,i). We
consider a single zealot in favor of opinion A (called A zealot in the following) and that in
favor of B (B zealot) such that they influence some independent voters, perhaps with different
control gains. We do not lose generality by assuming a single zealot of each type because two A
zealots influencing independent voter i with a unity control gain is equivalent to one A zealot
influencing i with a control gain equal to two.
From zealots’ perspectives, each “party” (i.e., zealot) may be interested in wisely selecting
pA,i and pB,i (1 ≤ i ≤ N) under given constraints. For example, the sum of the control gain may
be upper-bounded because the cost of control is proportional to the total gain. Alternatively,
each type of zealot may be able to control a given number of nodes each with a unity gain if the
party has to make a binary decision regarding whether or not to persuade each independent
voter and accessing individual independent voters is a costly process.
In each update event, one of the independent voters in the network, node i, is selected
with equal probability 1/N . Then, i copies the opinion of one of its upstream neighbors in the
network (usual neighbors in the case of undirected network) or that of a zealot if i is directly
influenced by it. The independent voter or the zealot whose opinion i mimicks is selected with
the probability proportional to the link weight or the control gain. Figure 1 is a schematic
example of an undirected and unweighted network. Suppose that node i, which has degree four
and is controlled by the A zealot (with the unity gain assumed, i.e., pA,i = 1), is selected for up-
dating. Among the four neighboring independent voters and the A zealot, three possess opinion
A (filled circles and square) and two opinion B (open circles). Therefore, i adopts opinion A
and B with probability 3/5 and 2/5, respectively. Generally speaking, a selected node i selects
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the opinion of independent voter j for copying with probability wji/
(∑N
ℓ=1wℓi + pA,i + pB,i
)
,
the A zealot with probability pA,i/
(∑N
ℓ=1wℓi + pA,i + pB,i
)
, and the B zealot with probability
pB,i/
(∑N
ℓ=1wℓi + pA,i + pB,i
)
. The update rule is the same as the so-called VM (voter model)
rule among the three main update rules proposed in Refs. [27, 28]. The other update rules are
briefly discussed in section 4.
Each node is updated once per unit time on average. Owing to the presence of zealots in the
opposite opinions, the consensus (also called fixation) of either opinion never occurs [16–21].
We are interested in the fraction of nodes in favor of each opinion in the equilibrium.
3 Results
3.1 Meanfield analysis
We start with a meanfield analysis assuming a well-mixed infinite population corresponding to
an undirected and unweighted network of infinite size. For this case, more elaborate theoretical
results regarding distributions of the number of independent voters in either opinion are avail-
able [16,18,19]. Denote by x (0 ≤ x ≤ 1) the fraction of independent voters possessing opinion
A. The fraction of independent voters possessing opinion B is equal to 1− x. We assume that
there are an additional fraction of a and b zealots in favor of A and B, respectively, where
the fraction refers to that relative to the number of independent voters. For example, a = 0.1
implies that the number of A zealot is equal to 10% of the number of the independent voters.
We also assume that the zealots affect each independent voter with a unity gain. Finally, we
assume a, b > 0. Although the original model has a single zealot in each opinion, in this section
we translated it to the fraction of zealots because a single zealot does not have an influence in
an infinite population unless the number of independent voters that the zealot influences or the
control gain is infinite.
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In this situation, the opinion formation dynamic is given by
dx
dt
= (1− x)(x+ a)− x(1− x+ b), (1)
where t is time. The steady state is given by
x∗ =
a
a+ b
. (2)
This steady state is stable with the eigenvalue −a− b < 0; if the fraction of zealot is large, the
convergence to the equilibrium given by Eq. (2) is fast. Equation (2) implies that the fraction
of the opinion of independent voters in the equilibrium is equal to that of zealots.
3.2 Average opinion of independent voters in general networks
Denote by uA,i (1 ≤ i ≤ N) the probability that independent voter i takes opinion A. The
probability that i takes opinion B is given by uB,i = 1 − uA,i. The master equation of the
opinion dynamics is given by
duA,i
dt
= (1− uA,i)
∑N
j=1wjiuA,j + pA,i∑N
ℓ=1wℓi + pA,i + pB,i
− uA,i
∑N
j=1wji(1− uA,j) + pB,i∑N
ℓ=1wℓi + pA,i + pB,i
. (3)
In the steady state, we set the left-hand side of Eq. (3) to zero to obtain
[L+ diag (pA,1 + pB,1, . . . , pA,N + pB,N)]


uA,1
...
uA,N

 =


pA,1
...
pA,N

 . (4)
Matrix L = (Lij) is the N ×N Laplacian of the network defined by
Lij = δij
N∑
ℓ=1
wℓi − (1− δij)wji (1 ≤ i, j ≤ N), (5)
where δij is the kronecker delta. In Eq. (4), diag represents the N ×N diagonal matrix whose
diagonal elements are specified by the arguments. In fact, uA,i is equivalent to the ith element
of u3
1
in Ref. [29] derived from the Laplacian matrix for the extended network including the
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zealots, where we interpret m = 2, b = 3, and the A zealot, the B zealot, and the strongly
connected network of independent voters correspond to the first, second, and third blocks,
respectively, of the irreducible normal form given by Eq. (9) in Ref. [29]. It should also be
noted that Eq. (4) above is equivalent to Eq. (3) in Ref. [20], which the authors derived by
assuming that every independent voter was controlled by a zealot (i.e., pA,i+ pB,i > 0 for all i).
The share of opinion A in the steady state, denoted by SA, is given by
SA =
∑N
i=1 uA,i
N
. (6)
The steady state, uB,i (1 ≤ i ≤ N), and the share of opinion B in the steady state, SB, are given
by Eqs. (4) and (6), respectively, with A replaced by B. It should be noted that uA,i+ uB,i = 1
(1 ≤ i ≤ N) and hence SA + SB = 1 (Appendix A).
Equation (3) can be rewritten as
duA,i
dt
=
∑N
j=1wji(uA,j − uA,i) + pA,i(1− uA,i) + pB, i(0− uB,i)∑N
ℓ=1wℓi + pA,i + pB,i
. (7)
This is the continuous-time DeGroot model [30, 31], if we interpret uA,i as the continuously
valued opinion, with one and zero corresponding to the pure opinion A and pure opinion B,
respectively. It should be noted that Eq. (7) implies that the independent voters attract each
other and are also attracted to A (i.e., 1) and B (i.e., 0) with gain pA,i and pB,i, respectively.
3.3 Toy examples
Consider the undirected and unweighted complete graph with control gains pA,i = a and pB,i = b
(1 ≤ i ≤ N). We substitute Lij = δij(N − 1)− (1 − δij) in Eq. (4) to obtain uA,i = a/(a + b)
(1 ≤ i ≤ N). This result is consistent with that obtained from the meanfield analysis in
section 3.1.
Consider a undirected and unweighted star with N nodes (Fig. 2). Node 1 is the unique
hub adjacent to all other nodes, each of which is only adjacent to the hub. Assume that the
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B zealot controls node 2 with gain b (i.e., pB,i = bδi,2) and that the A zealot controls either
the hub or a non-hub with gain a. Equation (4) yields the following results. If the A zealot
controls the hub, we obtain uA,i = (ab + a)/(ab + a + b) (i 6= 2), uA,2 = a/(ab + a + b), and
SA = [((N − 1)ab/N + a] /(ab+a+b). If the A zealot controls node 2, we obtain uA,i = a/(a+b)
(1 ≤ i ≤ N) and SA = a/(a + b). If the A zealot control single node i (3 ≤ i ≤ N), we
obtain uA,i = (ab + a)/(2ab + a + b) (i = 1, 4 ≤ i ≤ N), uA,2 = a/(2ab + a + b), uA,3 =
(2ab+ a)/(2ab+ a+ b), and SA = (ab+ a)/(2ab+ a + b).
The behavior of the share of opinion A (i.e., SA) when we set b = 1, N → ∞, and vary a
is shown in Fig. 3. As expected, SA increases with a in all cases. When the A zealot controls
the hub (black line), SA is larger than when the A zealot controls a non-hub (red and blue
lines). When the A zealot controls a non-hub node, SA is equal to 0.5 at a = 1 because the
other zealot also controls a non-hub with the same gain. However, when a 6= 1, SA depends on
whether the non-hub nodes that the two zealots control are the the same (red line) or different
(blue line).
3.4 Numerical results
In this section, we numerically evaluate the effect of control protocols on one model network
and three real-world networks. We do not assume self connection in the following.
3.4.1 Numerical procedure
We numerically calculate SA and SB as follows. Because L+diag (pA,1 + pB,1, . . . , pA,N + pB,N )
is diagonally dominant, we can obtain its solution by iteration methods such as the Jacobi and
Gauss-Seidel iteration [32]. Starting from some initial conditions, which we set to uA,i = uB,i =
1/2 (1 ≤ i ≤ N), we repeat
uA,i ←
pA,i +
∑N
j=1wjiuA,j∑N
ℓ=1wℓi + pA,i + pB,i
, (8)
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where ← means that we substitute the right-hand side in the left-hand side. We carry out
Eq. (8) simultaneously for all i in the case of the Jacobi iteration, which we use in the following
numerical simulations. Finally, we use Eq. (6) to calculate SA (and SB = 1− SA).
3.4.2 Baraba´si-Albert (BA) model
We start with the Baraba´si-Albert (BA) model network having N = 200 nodes. The model
produces scale-free networks with the power-law exponent of the degree distribution equal to
three when N →∞ [33]. To generate a network, we assume that there are initially two nodes
that are connected by a link and that any arriving node brings in two links. The generated
network has 397 undirected and unweighted links.
First, we examine the case in which both zealots control a single node with the same gain.
The B zealot is assumed to control the node with either the largest or the smallest degree. If
there are multiple nodes with the same degree, we randomly select one. The share of opinion
A when the A zealot controls one of the N nodes is shown in Figs. 4(a) and 4(b) for the gain
equal to 1 and 10, respectively. In these figures, the circles and squares represent the results
when the B zealot controls the node with the smallest and largest degree, respectively. The
nodes controlled by the B zealot are the same between Figs. 4(a) and 4(b).
Figure 4 indicates that the share of opinion A is large when the A zealot controls a node
with a large degree. The share of A is larger when the B zealot controls the node with the
smallest degree (circles) than that with the largest degree (squares). These results indicate
that it is efficient to control hubs rather than small-degree nodes, which is consistent with the
previous results [16,26]. However, the degree is a dominant but not the sole determinant of the
share of A, consistent with a previously made remark [21]. Controlling nodes with the same
degree generally leads to different SA values. In addition, in Fig. 4(b), SA is slightly larger
for the node with degree 22 than the largest-degree node (i.e., degree 34) when the B zealot
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controls the node with the smallest degree (circles). As a separate observation, for a larger
control gain (Fig. 4(b)), the share of A is more sensitive to the degree than for a smaller control
gain (Fig. 4(a)). This is intuitively because a large control gain implies that the influence of
the zealots is relatively important in opinion formation dynamics as compared to peer-to-peer
interaction between independent voters.
Next, we assume that each zealot controls ten nodes with the same gain and examine the
case in which the A zealot optimizes the set of nodes to be controlled. The B zealot is assumed
to control ten randomly selected nodes. The A zealot is allowed to use this information. First,
the A zealot starts with controlling randomly selected ten nodes. Second, we calculate the
share of opinion A, SA. Third, we tentatively swap one randomly selected controlled node with
one randomly selected uncontrolled node. Fourth, we recalculate SA. If the new SA value is
larger than the old value, then we adopt the swapping. Otherwise, we discard the swapping.
We repeat swapping attempts 2× 104 times unless otherwise stated.
The SA values after the optimization are shown in Table 1 for the control gain equal to 1,
10, and 100. In the table, we also show the results for the degree-based protocol [26], which
is defined by the A zealot controlling the ten nodes with the largest degrees. We break ties
by randomly selecting the required number of nodes with the threshold degree. For example,
suppose that the network is undirected and unweighted, there are nine nodes whose degree
is at least 20, and there are three nodes with degree 19. Then, we control one of the three
nodes with degree 19 and the nine nodes with the larger degrees. For each gain value, the
ten nodes that the B zealot controls is the same between the optimized and degree-based A
zealot. Table 1 suggests that SA after optimization is slightly larger than that obtained from
the degree-based protocol. The degree of the ten controlled nodes by the optimized A zealot,
degree-based A zealot, and the B zealot are shown in Figs. 4(c) and 4(d) for the gain equal
to 1 and 10, respectively. The B zealot mostly controls nodes with small degrees owing to the
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scale-free property of the BA model. The optimized A zealot tends to control hubs. However,
some nodes that the optimized A zealot controls are not among the ten largest-degree nodes.
3.4.3 Coauthorship network
As a second example, we examine a coauthorship network of network scientists [34]. The
network is undirected and unweighted and has 1589 nodes and 2742 links. We use the largest
connected component of this network containing N = 379 nodes and 914 links. The numerical
procedure is the same as that used in the case of the BA model. The numerical results are
shown in Fig. 5 and Table 1. The general tendency is the same as that for the results for
the BA model. However, the degree of the controlled node affects the results less strongly
than in the case of the BA model. In fact, controlling various single nodes, including those
with small degrees, yields a larger share of opinion A than controlling the largest-degree hub
(Fig. 5). The difference between the share of A attained by the optimization and that attained
by the degree-based protocol is also larger for the coauthorship network than for the BA model
(Table 1).
3.4.4 Email communication network
As a third example, we examine the largest connected component of email exchange network
between members of the University Rovira i Virgili, Tarragona, Spain [35]. This network is
undirected and unweighted and has N = 1133 nodes and 5451 links. The numerical results
for this network are shown in Fig. 6 and Table 1. The correlation between the degree of the
controlled node and the share of opinion A is very large for this network (Fig. 6). As a result,
the share of A obtained after the optimization and that based on the degree-based protocol are
only slightly different (Table 1).
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3.4.5 Directed online social network
All networks examine so far are undirected networks. In the voter model without zealots,
the impact of node i as measured by the fixation probability, i.e., the probability that the
opinion starting solely from node i is eventually adopted by all nodes in the network, is equal
to the degree of node i [27,28]. This may be the reason why the degree-based protocol is close
to optimal for some undirected networks, i.e., the BA model and the email communication
network. In contrast, the fixation probability for a node can substantially deviate from the
out-degree (i.e., the number of other nodes that the focal node directly influences) in directed
networks [36]. Therefore, we postulate that the optimal nodes to be controlled may considerably
deviate from high out-degree nodes in directed networks.
To examine this possibility, we use an online social network among students at University
of California, Irvine [37]. The network has N = 1899 nodes and 20296 directed and weighted
links. We focus on the largest strongly connected component of this network containing 1294
nodes and 19026 weighted links. The numerical results are shown in Fig. 7 and Table 1. We
increased the number of iterations in the optimization procedure to 5 × 104 because the SA
value was still increasing to some extent at the 2× 104th iterate. The results indicate that the
out-degree is not a good predictor of the impact of the node when it is controlled.
4 Discussion
We studied a problem of maximizing votes in opinion formation dynamics in complex networks
when two opposing parties influence subsets of nodes. We proposed a heuristic algorithm based
on exact counting of the mean vote and applied it to artificial and real complex networks.
We showed that the degree of the controlled node was a main determinant of the efficiency of
control in undirected networks, which is consistent with previous results [26]. Controlling hubs
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is generally a good strategy. However, optimized selection of the controlled nodes realized a
larger share of the desired opinion than the degree-based protocol did. The difference between
the performance of the two methods was particularly large in directed networks.
We used the VM rule for opinion updating. In non-regular networks (i.e., networks in
which some nodes have different degrees), different update rules, namely, the invasion process
(IP) and link dynamics (LD), substantially change the outcome of opinion formation dynamics
in the absence of zealots [27, 28, 36, 38]. Extending the present framework to these cases is
straightforward because the use of a different update rule corresponds to assigning a rescaled
weight to each link [36]. In undirected networks without zealots, the fixation probability of
the node is proportional to the degree under the VM rule, inversely proportional to the degree
under the IP rule, and independent of the degree under the LD rule [27, 28]. In the present
study, we showed that, in the presence of zealots, the effect of the control is strongly correlated
with the degree of the controlled node in undirected networks. Given the two results, it may
be better to control small-degree nodes under the IP rule, and the degree of controlled nodes
may be irrelevant under the LD rule.
There are several possible extensions of the present work. First, the proposed algorithm
was not fast, in particular when the control gain was small. This was why our examples were
relatively small networks (i.e., up to N ≈ 1300 nodes). The bottleneck seems to be the Jacobi
iteration. In addition, we employed a greedy method for optimization, which may be also
inefficient. Perturbation methods with which to assess the change in the eigenvector upon an
external change (i.e., a slightly altered set of controlled nodes in our case) [39–43] and genetic
algorithms [24, 25] may be useful for designing better optimization algorithms.
Second, we assumed during optimization that the opponent zealot (i.e., B) did not change
the set of controlled nodes. Only the focal zealot (i.e., A) was allowed to strategically behave
to update the set of controlled nodes. This is an important limitation of the present study. In
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more realistic situations, the optimal selection of controlled nodes should depend on what the
opponent does. Allowing both zealots to strategically behave may be an interesting question.
An obtained equilibrium may be formulated as a game-theoretic equilibrium.
Third, we assumed that the complete knowledge of the network of independent voters was
available to the controllers. In practical situations such as real voting and social mobilization,
this assumption would be violated. Methods applicable when only partial knowledge of the
network is available are desired.
Fourth, our analysis was concerned with the mean vote count in the steady state. In fact,
the opinion of each agent fluctuates between the two opinions even in the equilibrium. Previous
studies quantified such fluctuations for meanfield populations [16, 18, 19] and mathematically
proved the presence of fluctuations under some conditions for networks [20,21]. Quantifying the
fluctuations for general networks may be possible. In addition, actual elections may occur before
the equilibrium is reached. Therefore, analysis of transient dynamics seems to be of practical
importance. Related to this issue, the convergence rate of opinion dynamics depending on the
location of zealots was examined in recent literature [44].
Fifth, we considered the case of two opinions for simplicity. Extension to the case of more
than two opinions is straightforward. A theory of node importance in directed networks when
there are a general number of root node [29] may prove useful to this end.
Sixth, we did not explore effects of self loops although our formulation allowed them. An
increase in the weight of a self loop makes the corresponding independent voter relatively deaf
to others’ opinions when updating its own opinion. With a large weight of a self loop, the
independent voter plays a role close to that of a zealot.
Seventh, controlling a single node with a large gain (e.g., 10) and controlling many nodes
with a small gain (e.g., 10 nodes with a unity gain) may make a difference. We did not explore
this point. It should be noted that, even if the total gain exerted by the controller is the same,
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controlling many nodes with small gains may be practically more costly than controlling one
node with a large gain [9].
Last, effects of zealots have also been examined for other collective dynamics such as a local
majority vote model [45], the naming game [46–48], Axelrod’s model for cultural dissemination
[49], a model with agents in a neutral position [50], and the prisoner’s dilemma game [51–53].
Maximization of the vote by pinning control may be also relevant in these contexts.
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Appendix A: Proof of uA,i + uB,i = 1
By summing Eq. (4) and its equivalent for opinion B, we obtain
[L+ diag (pA,1 + pB,1, . . . , pA,N + pB,N)]


uA,1 + uB,1
...
uA,N + uB,N

 =


pA,1 + pB,1
...
pA,N + pB,N

 . (9)
Because L + diag (pA,1 + pB,1, . . . , pA,N + pB,N) is diagonally dominant, Eq. (9) has a unique
solution for unknowns uA,1 + uB,1, . . ., uA,N + uB,N . In fact, uA,i + uB,i = 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ N) solves
Eq. (9) because L is a Laplacian matrix such that it has a zero right eigenvector (1, . . . , 1)⊤,
where ⊤ denotes the transposition. Therefore, uA,i + uB,i = 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ N) holds true.
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iA B
network
Figure 1: Schematic of opinion control and opinion updating. The circles represent independent
voters. The squares represent zealots. The filled and open symbols correspond to opinions A
and B, respectively. Upon updating, node i adopts opinions A and B with probability 3/5 and
2/5, respectively.
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Figure 2: Star graph having seven nodes.
25
 0
 0.25
 0.5
 0.75
 1
 0  1  2  3  4  5
sh
ar
e 
of
 o
pi
ni
on
 A
a
node 1
node 2
non-hub other than node 2
Figure 3: Share of opinion A in the star graph. We set b = 1, N →∞, and vary a. The legend
represents the node that the A zealot controls. The B zealot controls node 2 in all cases.
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Figure 4: Results for the BA model with N = 200 nodes and 397 links. The results when each
zealot controls a single node are shown in (a) and (b). The control gain is set to 1 in (a) and
10 in (b) for both zealots. The circles and squares in these panels represent the cases in which
the B zealot controls the node with the smallest and largest degree, respectively. The value
on the horizontal axis represents the degree of the node that the A zealot controls. In (c) and
(d), the degrees of the controlled nodes when each zealot controls ten nodes are shown in the
descending order. The rank refers to that in terms of the degree. Given randomly selected
ten nodes that the B zealot controls, whose degrees are shown by the triangles, the optimized
A zealot controls ten nodes whose degrees are shown by the circles. The degrees of the ten
largest-degree nodes, which the A zealot using the degree-based protocol controls, are shown
by the squares. The control gain is set to 1 in (c) and 10 in (d) per node for both zealots. In
(c) and (d), we have used different sets of randomly selected ten nodes for the B zealot. The
degrees shown by the squares in (c) and (d) are the same.
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Figure 5: Results for the coauthorship network in network science with N = 379 nodes and
914 links. The results when each zealot controls a single node are shown in (a) and (b). The
control gain for both zealots is set to 1 in (a) and 10 in (b). The degrees of the controlled nodes
when each zealot controls ten nodes are shown in (c) and (d) when the gain is equal to 1 and
10, respectively. See the caption of Fig. 4 for legends.
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Figure 6: Results for the email communication network with N = 1133 nodes and 5451 links.
The results when each zealot controls a single node are shown in (a) and (b). The degrees of
the controlled nodes when each zealot controls ten nodes are shown in (c) and (d). In (a) and
(c), the gain is set to 1. In (b) and (d), the gain is set to 10. See the caption of Fig. 4 for
legends.
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Figure 7: Results for the online social network with N = 1294 nodes and 19026 links. The
results when each zealot controls a single node are shown in (a) and (b). The out-degrees of
the controlled nodes when each zealot controls ten nodes are shown in (c) and (d). In (a) and
(c), the gain is set to 1. In (b) and (d), the gain is set to 10. See the caption of Fig. 4 for
legends.
30
Table 1: Share of opinion A when the A zealot has optimized the controlled nodes and when
it has used the degree-based protocol. Each zealot controls ten nodes. BA: Baraba´si-Albert
model, netsci: coauthorship network of network scientists, email: email communication net-
work, online: online social network. We have used different sets of randomly selected ten nodes
for the B zealot for different gain values.
network gain optimized degree-
based
1 0.576 0.574
BA 10 0.713 0.703
100 0.810 0.793
1 0.599 0.580
netsci 10 0.744 0.686
100 0.869 0.765
1 0.570 0.570
email 10 0.679 0.670
100 0.860 0.840
1 0.896 0.678
online 10 0.898 0.811
100 0.947 0.929
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